Edith Cowan University

Research Online
ECU Publications Pre. 2011
2001

Are bank deposits and bank-affiliated managed funds close
substitutes?
David E. Allen
Jerry T. Parwada

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks
Part of the Statistics and Probability Commons
Allen, D., & Parwada, J. (2001). Are Bank Deposits and Bank-affiliated Managed Funds Close Substitutes? Perth,
Australia: Edith Cowan University.
This Other is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks/7104

Are Bank Deposits and Bank-affiliated Managed Funds Close Substitutes?
By
David E. Allen
Edith Cowan University and Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific
and
Jerry T. Parwada
Edith Cowan University and Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific

School of Accounting, Finance and Economics Working Paper Series
Edith Cowan University
March 2001
Working Paper 0201
ISSN: 1323-9244

Correspondence author and address:
Professor David E. Allen
School of Finance and Business Economics
Faculty of Business and Public Management
Edith Cowan University
100 Joondalup Drive
Joondalup WA 6027
Phone:
61+ 08 9400 5471
Fax:
61+ 08 9400 5271
Email:
d.allen@ecu.edu.au

Abstract
This study tests the hypothesis that bank liabilities and managed funds are
close substitutes. Some literature associates the alleged decline in banking
business with the disintermediation of banks’ traditional deposit-taking
business in favour of investment management. A comparative assessment
of managed fund and bank deposit qualitative attributes fails to support
substitutability. Using data on Australian bank-affiliated funds and a nineyear record of bank liability balances, this study finds that, empirically,
managed funds do not displace bank liabilities. Prudential capital adequacy
requirements dissuade banks from using in-house managed investments as
indirect conduits for raising funds in the same manner as deposit taking.
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1.

Introduction

The phenomenal growth of the mutual and pension fund sectors has led to premature
claims of a considerable decline in the role of banks in financial intermediation. Consensus
appears to be settling around a new theory of intermediation that recognises that banks have
simply rearranged their business to offer new forms of intermediation that have emerged out
of financial markets’ demand for additional services beyond the asset transformation aspect of
intermediation. Allen and Santomero (1998 and 2001) have led the recent debate on the need
to take risk management and the cutting of participation costs, for example, as important
factors to consider in determining what intermediaries do. Adopting this understanding of
intermediation allows for the acceptance of the notion that the business of banking, under a
strong challenge from financial market participants such as mutual funds, is being redefined
to encompass such non-traditional activities.
The motivation for this paper is that in the current era of the transformation of
intermediation, no explicit microeconomic evidence has been produced on the substitutability
of bank liabilities and mutual fund products. Yet banking literature is strewn with indirect
references to the existence of the phenomenon. Gallo et al (1996) contend, with reference to
the late 1980s and early 1990s in the US, that declining interest rate levels prompted a shift in
household savings from traditional bank deposits to mutual funds. This shift is alleged to have
pushed banks, fearful of disintermediation, into the mutual fund business.1 Commenting on
the question of the indispensability or otherwise of commercial banks, Scott (1998) asserts
that savings and time deposits at banks might be under threat as mutual funds become an
alternative for the current payment system. This view extends a trend, triggered off by the
rapid growth of alternatives to traditional intermediaries, that associates investment managers
with “banks of the future” (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1993).
Kane (1995) stands out in challenging the market-centric cliché of the disintermediation
of bank deposits by querying why banks, faced with competition for deposits from mutual
funds, have not simply structured products that offer mutual fund-like payoffs instead of
establishing costly fully-fledged mutual fund subsidiaries. Kane concludes that it is the
inapplicability of deposit insurance requirements to bank-affiliated mutual funds in the US,
not-withstanding the credit enhancement implied in their association with the banks, that has
provided banks with an incentive to form mutual fund operations instead of index-linked
deposit products. Kane points to Australia where, by the mid-1990s, at least one major bank
was developing such an index-linked offering against a background of the non-existence of
deposit insurance. However, as it has turned out since then, although more banks have
developed index-linked deposit products, they have also taken part in the frenetic mergers and
acquisition activity in the second half of the 1990s that has given the major banks large
exposures to funds management business.
These market developments have, however, not marked the death of Kane’s (1995)
argument. In a case that might suggest that banks favour a definition of managed fund
products as being close substitutes for bank deposits, Commonwealth Bank, one of the four
largest banks in Australia, in its application for the approval of its merger with Colonial, a
dominant funds management group, was reported to have unsuccessfully applied to the
Australian Competition and Consumer Authority (ACCC) to have managed funds and trusts
included in the market definition encompassing term deposits and transaction accounts
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(Goddard and Walker, 2001). The ACCC subsequently maintained separate definitions for
the two product classes in the spirit of its traditional market definition process that identifies
“all sources and potential sources of close substitutes for the merged firm’s products” as a
prelude to a ruling on a merger proposal.2
The apparent willingness by practitioners to treat bank products and mutual fund
offerings as substitutes, compounded by a possible similar perception by depositors, may lead
to funding problems for banking institutions. Mutual funds may be profitable business lines
for banks, but the prudentially enforced principle of separation between the banking and funds
management activities housed under a single corporate entity dictates funds raised this way
are not equivalent to other forms of liabilities such as deposits. The seriousness of the issue is
illustrated by the issuance of a warning in November 2001 by Standard and Poor’s that the
funding pressures being faced by banks due, in part, to the waning of the traditional low-cost
deposit base as customers increasingly shift towards higher yielding investment options such
as managed funds, “could contribute incrementally to negative ratings sentiment in the
Australian banking market”.3
Contrary to the view encouraged by apparent investor shifts towards market based
investment vehicles, the physical attributes of managed funds do not fully conform to their
substitutability for bank products. Pilloff (1999) observes that, in spite of similarities in
safety, liquidity, accessibility and convenience, the lack of absolute capital preservation
guarantees, liquidity constraints and the continued dominance of bank accounts in household
finances preclude a verdict of substitutability.
This paper uses panel data on monthly bank liability balances over nine years and a
dataset of managed funds covering nine years to quantitatively document the displacement or
otherwise of bank investment-type liabilities by managed fund products. The paper that is
closest to the present one in addressing the question of the closeness of money market
oriented managed funds is Farinella and Koch (1999) that differentiates from a
macroeconomic standpoint transactions and yield-based incentives for households to hold
money market funds. The work conjectures that if the former incentives exceed the latter, and
this is exhibited in actual household preferences, then money market funds would be
considered close to money, and hence deposits and other savings products offered by banks.
To this end, an analysis of the demand for taxable money market funds shows that the
demand is positively related to fund yields but negatively related to the demand for
competing, tax-exempt, funds and the long-term government bond yield. On the basis of this
indirect evidence Farinella and Koch’s (1999) findings are mixed; they conclude that both
transactions and yield motives exist.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. The next section performs Pilloff’s (1999)
descriptive analysis in the Australian context and develops a testable model for the
displacement of banking products by managed fund products. Section 3 describes the data
used in this paper and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 summarises and
concludes the paper.
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2.

Managed Fund—Bank Liability Substitutability

2.1

A descriptive analysis

This section assesses the substitutability of Australian bank-managed funds for bank
liabilities in the context Pilloff’s (1999) descriptive framework, paraphrased here to consist of
three main elements: (1) liquidity and accessibility, (2) safety and price stability, and (3)
demand trends. Whilst Pilloff (1999) restricts the analysis to money market mutual funds
(MMMFs), this paper adopts a broader scope by considering cash and fixed income funds in
addition to cash management trusts (CMTs), the Australian equivalent of MMMFs. Figure 1
summarises Pilloff’s major conclusions under the subheadings applied in this section.
(i)

Liquidity and Accessibility

Although fund managers’ promotional literature routinely claims that they offer the
convenience of bank-offered savings products, it is on this issue that Pilloff’s (1999) findings
of the lack of substitution effects are found to most directly apply to the Australian context.
Whilst liquidity and accessibility are available to a degree to managed fund investors,
there are discrepancies that vary with fund types. For example, cash management trusts
generally include access to deposit, cheque and online transactions offered by the parent bank
but these will not be directly via the fund account. In fact CMTs are prohibited from
accepting direct cash deposits and withdrawals, all transactions being by cheques drawn on an
account held by the fund operator at a deposit-taking institution. Funds that offer a
chequebook restrict the denomination of the transaction amounts, usually to $500 lots.
Ease of entry is a major convenience issue for investors. Banks are believed to be able
to exercise a “second-degree price discrimination” of customers based on income and wealth
by offering accounts that have different minimum balances and interest rates. Pennacchi
(1998) points out that US mutual funds face legal constraints on the types of accounts they
can offer, precluding clientele segmentation of this nature. However, Australian managed
funds are allowed reserve the right to vary the fees, minimum investment amounts and other
account operating conditions specified in the fund prospectus across customers.4
Having ready access to invested monies is an important facet of the liquidity and,
therefore, the convenience of investment products. Managed funds generally allow
redemptions on demand, although this is generally taken to mean they will be processed
within five working days. In addition, fund managers are allowed to withhold redemptions for
up to sixty days depending on the cash position of the funds and market conditions. Some
funds specifically warn that such delays may be exacerbated “if investment markets were
disrupted or suspended”.5
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(ii)

Safety and Price Stability

Unlike in the US where deposit insurance is the major differentiating factor between
investments held with banks and mutual fund shareholding, the absence of a deposit
protection scheme in Australia may be taken as precluding the notion that the respective
product classes are substitutes. However, some market participants hold the belief that the
major banks are “too big to fail” in that the Reserve Bank of Australia cannot permit these
banks to fail because their collapse would have devastating effects on the economy.
Australia’s rigidly enforced competition policy that precludes mergers amongst the four
largest banks has only served to fuel the perception of the sanctity of their guaranteed
immunity from bankruptcy. From the perspective of this study it is instructive to note that it is
these major banks that dominate the participation of banks in funds management business, a
factor that may potentially exacerbate the proliferation of the belief in implied government
protection amongst the clientele of bank-affiliated fund managers.
In addition, Australian bank prudential requirements apparently imply that bankaffiliated managed funds offer protection to their investors that exceed that of other funds.
After analysing the portfolio composition of institutional investment managers, Del Guercio
(1996) finds that amongst US mutual fund operators, “bank managers are more sensitive to
prudent-man laws”.6 In the Australian context, the equivalent of prudent-man laws are the
fiduciary responsibilities imposed on fund managers by the Managed Investments Act. It can
be argued that over and above the due care and diligence measures imposed on fund managers
in general, bank-affiliated fund managers are laden with additional oversight from the
regulator of deposit-taking institutions, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority
(APRA). This oversight is established by APRA’s prudential standard APS 120 (Funds
Management and Securitisation) that “aims to ensure that ADIs adopt prudent practices to
manage the risks arising out of their involvement in funds management and securitisation
activities, and to ensure that appropriate capital is held against them”. The main thrust of the
guideline is to unambiguously set funds management as an activity that is separate from the
banking business of the institution.7 Conceivably, this separation may be taken to allow bankaffiliated fund managers to carry out their business like any other manager without being
curtailed by the institutional affiliation. However, when taken within the context of the
regulator’s apparent determination to preserve the reputation of the parent bank and the
potential capital requirements that imprudent actions within the funds management arm may
entail, bank-owned fund managers can be construed by investors to be under pressure to
behave somewhat more prudently than other managers.
If there is downside in respect of the prudential requirements imposed on fund managers
by virtue of their affiliation to a bank, it arises if the association hobbles the performance of
bank-managed funds in comparison to non-bank funds. Del Guercio (1996) suggests that
prudent-man laws may force bank-managed funds to tilt their portfolio compositions in ways
that may, over time, explain the performance differences between them and non-bank funds.
Koppenhaver (1999) examines money market mutual funds and, finding that funds affiliated
with banks outperform those sponsored by other financial institutions, advances the argument
that the abnormal performance may be due to bank expertise in dealing with money market
securities and issuers. However, Frye (2001) explicitly tests for the existence of the
performance discrepancy predicted by Del Guercio (2000) and, despite finding evidence of
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more conservative investment practices by bank-managed funds, cannot observe a significant
difference in return profiles.
An aspect of investor protection in which the funds management industry is uniquely
subject to legal uncertainty is the liability of investors. Intuitively, it would be expected that
investors should not be personally liable in the event that a managed fund to which they
subscribe goes insolvent and fails to meet its obligations. However, as a result of past legal
precedent that did not fully address the issue of whether investors enjoy limited liability and
the decision of the federal government not to clarify the situation by legislation, fund
managers cannot explicitly guarantee their investors’ equivalence of the corporate veil8. Fund
investor protection is governed by the Corporations Law and general law. Internally, in
addition to the constitution which outlines the responsible entity’s fiduciary responsibilities
and investors’ rights, the Compliance Plan, audited by the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC), sets out guidelines on how the fund manager is to ensure
compliance with the law and the fund constitution. The fund constitution generally provides
that unit holders cannot be called upon to indemnify the responsible entity or its creditors for
liabilities in excess of the assets of the fund. In spite of this layer of protection, it is
conceivable that in certain instances, depending on the particular wording of the constitution,
liability can be excluded, a possibility that has compelled ASIC to require that all
prospectuses should carry a statement to the effect that the limited liability cannot be
guaranteed owing to the uncertainty of the legal position9. Therefore, despite the apparent
additional protection accorded to investors of bank-affiliated managed funds by the prudential
requirements imposed on their parents, the enforcement of the separation dictum appears to
decisively expose bank-managed fund investors to the same uncertainty concerning the
liability of investors that pervades non-bank funds. When compared to investments in
conventional bank products, this uncertainty marks a wide rift between the perceived safety of
bank deposits, for instance, and that of managed fund offerings.
An important safety attribute of investment products concerns capital guarantees that
Australian money market oriented managed funds do not offer. Whilst some will state that
they seek to maintain their unit price at one dollar, almost all carry disclaimers to the effect
that investors are not guaranteed the full return of the money originally invested, as would be
the case with a solvent bank’s savings products.10
On balance, the foregoing discussion on safety and price stability appears to establish
managed funds as being less than perfect substitutes for bank savings products in terms of
safety and price stability. That managed funds are generally riskier than savings accounts at
banks is perhaps emphasised by the fact that they pay higher returns, the differential
signifying a risk premium on the former according to Pilloff (1999).11
(iii) Demand trends
Finally, it is important to consider whether, on the basis of trends in the demand for
bank liabilities and managed funds, the two respective investment avenues can be said to be
substitutes for one another. Pilloff (1999) observes that only 5.7% of households in the US
held money market funds compared to 84.4% that held cheque-operating or money market
deposit accounts in 1995. Of the percentage that held MMMF investments, 98.6% also had a
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cheque operating account or money market deposit account, a clear indication of the lack of
substitutability between the two. This general balance is indicated for the year 1992 as well.
From the Australian viewpoint, despite the trend towards increased household
preference for market-oriented investments, the available data show a somewhat diminished
role for traditional deposits but do not lend direct support for the idea that this has been a
result of the shift of depositors to managed funds. Figure 2 carries two graphs of the market
share enjoyed by bank deposits relative to cash management trusts, superannuation funds and
unit trusts (mutual funds). Figure 2A depicts the market share in terms of economic
importance by expressing the funds under management in the four investment classes as a
percentage of the gross domestic product. The domineering position held by bank deposits is
challenged by the phenomenal growth in investments held in superannuation owing largely to
the introduction of a compulsory pension scheme with the promulgation of the
Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act in 1992 which was projected to increase
employer contributions alone to 9% of total income earned by 2002-3.12 Indeed
superannuation assets rise from A$60 billion, or 14% of GDP, in 1988, to A$368 billion, 58%
of GDP, in 2001. CMTs and unit trusts have also risen to 4% (from 1%) and 22% (from 5%)
of GDP, respectively. In comparison, however, deposits have increased from A$123 billion,
29% of GDP, in 1988, to A$975 billion, 69% of GDP, in 2001.
Figure 2B graphs the results of adding up all the assets held in the four investment
classes and calculating market share ratios for each based on this total. The share held by
bank deposits has fallen from its peak of 62% in 1990 to 45% in 2001 whilst that of
superannuation assets has risen from 27% to 38% over the same period. CMTs have increased
their share by just a percentage point to 3% whilst unit trust assets have recovered from a
slight fall in popularity in the mid-nineties in which they attracted 8-9% of market share to
14% in 2001.
Regarding what the trends described above represent in terms of ownership distribution,
the dearth of data precludes an analysis over a reasonable history. Perhaps the most
authoritative survey on this issue is the Australian Stock Exchange’s 2000 Australian
Shareownership Study. According to this survey, 61% of adult Australians own “cash related
products such as bank deposits”. 34% indicated they invest in fixed interest products and 22%
in managed funds. By total funds invested, superannuation topped the list with 35%, followed
by cash related products (20%), investment property (15%), shares (13%), fixed interest
products (11%), managed funds (5%) and derivatives (1%).
Undoubtedly the demand for alternatives to bank deposits is sizeable. Whether the
trends that have culminated in the observed position of the alternatives in the economy, and
the popularity and ownership distribution of financial products are indicative of a direct
displacement of bank liabilities, in particular by products offered by banks’ own funds
management divisions, is the empirical question the rest of this paper attempts to answer.
2.2

Development of a testable model

The nascent literature on the disintermediation of bank deposits in favour of managed
funds suggests that mutual funds and bank liabilities are substitutes. Taken to its extreme, this
prediction implies that an increase in managed fund (MF) balances should lead to a decrease
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in bank liabilities (BL). This phenomenon could be described by the following BL to MF
displacement ratio:
BLRNMF = BLRMF + αMFRMF,

(1)

where BLR is the ratio of total bank liabilities to total assets defined as the assets held by the
bank; MFR is the ratio of bank subsidiary managed fund aggregate balances to bank total
assets; NMF and MF denote a bank without managed fund operations and one that has funds
management operations, respectively; and α is the MF-BL substitution coefficient13.
One view holds that the existence of bank-affiliated managed funds reduces the banking
sector’s reliance on traditional liabilities, implies that α>0 and conforms to three arguments
that correspond to α values of exactly 1; 0<α<1; and α>1. A value of 1 implies that a dollar
of managed fund balances reduces potential bank liabilities by a dollar. Intuitively it appears
more reasonable to assume that since a bank may rely on indirect means of offering managedfund-like products to its customers, such as index-linked deposits, the more likely value to be
observed is 0<α>1. Imperfect substitution may also arise if, owing to the comparative
illiquidity of managed fund products, savings in banking products are not reduced one-to-one
for an increase in fund balances. Observing a value of α>1 would confirm that, indeed, banks
are on a precipitous course towards the total delegation of the deposit-taking function to their
managed fund operations. Complementarity between MF and BL corresponds to a negative α.
Assuming that the BLR of a non-funds managing bank is a function of a number of
control variables which reflect the characteristics that determine the banks’ BLR, then the BL
to FM displacement ratio can be rewritten as:
C (Control Variables) = BLRMF + αMFRMF = BLRNMF.

(2)

Rearranging the above, it follows that the MF ratio of a bank is:
MFRMF = -1/αBLRMF + 1/α(Control Variables).

(3)

To operationalise the equation, assuming that control variables can be identified, the
following linear model can be estimated:
MFR = λ0 + λ 1(BLR) + λ i+1 (Control Variables).

(4)

Turning now to potential control variables, this paper adopts the following:
•

BL liquidity measured by the ratio of current deposits to total bank liabilities, henceforth
denoted BLQ. This variable reflects the portion of a bank’s liabilities that can easily
migrate to competitors or competing intra-group products.

•

BL size measured as the natural logarithm of total BL, denoted BLSIZE, and included
because size may reflect the bank’s ability to attract depositors who believe in the “toobig-to-fail” phenomenon or associate size with superior reputation. BLSIZE may also be
partially indicative of the bank’s capacity to increase its liabilities in relation to both
prudentially and internally-imposed capital adequacy constraints.
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•

Variability of BL calculated as the coefficient of variation of BL over the past year,
BLVA. A recent high variability history may be associated with a bank’s instituting of
measures to establish greater stability.

•

ASIC retirement savings account (RSA) approval status, assigned the dummy variable
RSAD. This dummy variable is included since there was a strong expectation that
retirement savings accounts would slow down the movement of savings from traditional
deposits into managed fund products.14 As customers can maintain RSAs as part of the
compulsory superannuation required by law, the market’s expectation that their
introduction would slow down the growth of other deposits would appear to contradict
Hubbard (1986) who suggests that the liquidity constraints that characterise pension
assets in general preclude the forced saving from displacing discretionary saving or
encouraging increased borrowings.

Having determined the potential explanatory variables for the level of managed fund
balances preferred by a bank, the model utilised to examine the relationship between bankmanaged funds and other bank liabilities is:
MFR = λ0 + λ 1(BLR) + λ2(BLVA) + λ3(BLSIZE) + λ4(BLQ) + λ5(RSAD) + ε
(5)
If MF and BL are substitutes, irrespective of the degree, α will be greater than 0 and
consequently λ 1, the BLR coefficient, will be negative.15
3.

Data

In order to test the model developed in Section 2 this section utilises asset and liability
data provided by APRA on all the banks that operated funds management entities directly
under the banking entity, as opposed to a subsidiary in a holding company structure, and that
were, therefore, subject to Prudential Standard APS 120.16 The APRA dataset itemises for
each bank the different components of liabilities. This study treats the aggregation of interest
bearing current deposits, term and call deposits, certificates of deposit and “other” liabilities
(including statement savings, savings investment, passbook and school savings accounts) as
the investment-type liabilities that are likely to be displaced by managed fund products. The
liabilities that are excluded are non-interest-bearing deposits, “other borrowings” (not
defined), bill acceptances and foreign currency liabilities. On the asset side, the APRA dataset
distinguishes domestic from foreign currency denominated assets. This paper uses Australian
dollar denominated assets to normalise the managed fund assets and bank investment-type
liabilities in estimating the displacement model to avoid introducing the influence of currency
fluctuations.
Individual managed fund data were provided by ASSIRT Research, Australia’s largest
fund ratings agency. The ASSIRT database identifies the institutional affiliation of the fund
managers and details the total funds under management on a monthly basis for the period
1992-2000 covered by the bank asset and liability data. As cash management trusts, the
equivalent of the money market mutual funds studied by Pilloff (1999), account for only 3%
of the assets under management in Australia, this study also includes cash and fixed interest
funds. The number of the funds used in this paper increases from 89 in 1992 to 190 in 2000,
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in tandem with the phenomenal growth in managed fund assets over the period. The funds
represent 69% or A$29.4 billion of the A$43.3 billion in assets under management held by
bank-affiliated funds at the end of 2000.
4.

Empirical Results

Since the banks that form the basis of this study are easily identifiable this paper
estimates the managed-fund – bank-liability displacement model using a sample that excludes
banks that do not operate funds-management divisions.17 Table 1 reports the estimates
obtained from OLS regressions of the model. Because of well-known autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity problems associated with models estimated with cross-sectional and timeseries data two provisions are made in coming up with the results. Firstly, to ameliorate
autocorrelation, models are estimated for each of the years in the 1992-2000 analysis period.
Secondly, each estimation is repeated to correct for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980)
procedure and the results reported separately for each instance in Panels A and B of Table 1,
respectively. Two-tailed t-Statistics are reported in parentheses.
The main finding of this paper is that the coefficient estimates on BLR are positive and
highly significant in the majority of the years with the only negative coefficient being
statistically insignificant. This result appears to rule out the substitutability of managed funds
for bank products and is in strongly suggestive of complementarity instead. On the basis of
this evidence, it would appear the Australian antitrust authorities are correct in maintaining
that bank deposits and managed funds do not occupy the same market definition.
Clearly, the observed complementarity is not exclusively strong. It could be conjectured
that some substitution effects occur at the margin as a result of banks’ indirect usage of
managed fund divisions as capital raising conduits. Prudential guidelines normally require
banks to set aside capital against any exposure to funds management operations in a
trusteeship or custodial role. However, in practice, banks are known to “reclaim” the lost
capacity to raise funds for lending via the funds management operations. For example,
observing that financial institutions fund their loans with both equity and wholesale debt,
primarily commercial paper, Pennacchi (1998) notes the commercial paper is sold to money
market funds that, in turn, invite investors to open transaction accounts with them. Indeed, in
Australia it is common for a bank-affiliated fixed interest fund, for example, to invest its
assets in financial securities originated by, or accounts operated by, the parent bank.
Additionally, as noted earlier in this paper, banks have been structuring index-linked products
that would appear to be close substitutes for managed funds; however, directly investigating
this issue is impeded by the lack of data on balances in such accounts.
The coefficient on BLSIZE is negative in all the years except 1999, an indication bank
liability size is negatively related to MFR. This is not surprising in light of anecdotal evidence
from market commentators that the biggest banks have been generally slow in growing their
funds management businesses, whether generic or acquisitive.18 The negative relationship
between MFR and BLSIZE also shows that although the investment classes are
complementary, the growth of funds under management does not play a significant role in
increasing bank liability balances.
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Assuming that an increased inflow of depositors’ funds into the most liquid bank
liabilities is a proxy for a certain sentiment against long term investments amongst the suite of
bank products, the existence of substitution effects between managed funds and bank
liabilities could be expected to be accompanied by a positive relationship between MFR and
the ratio of call deposits to total bank liabilities. Similarly, banks would be observed to react
to increased volatility in liabilities with increased managed fund balances to compensate for
the variability of its liability base. The results reflected by the BLQ coefficient are mixed,
with positive, statistically coefficients almost being matched by negative ones. However, the
majority of the BLVA coefficients are negative, indicating that unstable deposit balances do
not necessarily lead banks to secure managed fund subscriptions as substitutes, further
diminishing the substitutability argument.
Retirement savings accounts are direct competitors of funds operated by the same
banking entity. It is, therefore, not surprising that in Table 1 the RSAD dummy indicating the
authority granted to operate the accounts is negatively related to MFR in the latter three of the
four years that banks have been allowed to offer them. This implies that banks that offer
retirement savings have been able to reduce their reliance on managed fund operations in their
quest to participate in funds management activities. Whether this trend will continue is a
subject for future research.
The results in Table 1 are predominantly similar for both the heteroskedasticity-adjusted
and non-adjusted estimates. The only difference of note is in the form of marginally lower tstatistics for the heteroskedasticity-consistent results. The explanatory power of the
regressions is high, as depicted by adjusted R-squared ranging from 48% to 93% on an
increasing profile that reflects the inclusion of RSAD as an additional variable in 1997, when
the account was first authorised, onwards.
The managed fund data include wholesale (institutional) funds numbering 21in 2000
compared to 169 retail funds. To check whether the presence of wholesale funds influences
the results, the model is re-estimated on data that excludes the wholesale funds. The results
are not altered in any significant way in terms of the signs, magnitude and statistical
significance of the coefficients and are therefore not reported here.
With substitution effects ruled out, it is noteworthy that treating managed funds and
deposits as complements is costly for banks in relation to capital adequacy requirements. This
is because banks are required to set aside capital as they increase their direct exposure to
managed fund activities. Furthermore, there is a strong suggestion that banks may use
managed fund operations to indirectly raise funds for the asset side of their business.
Therefore, as a further test of the robustness of the results reported here, this study repeats the
regressions based on the substitution model tested on data for the individual banks spanning
1992-2000. Instead of the RSAD dummy variable, each bank’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR),
reported in the annual reports, is included. If regulatory intentions that are premised on capital
provision for incremental managed fund business taken up have a dominant effect, a negative
relationship between MFR and CAR should be observed.
The coefficient estimates for the individual bank pooled regressions are reported in
Table 2. The number of banks is reduced to five as two of the banks were not publicly listed
and, as such, did not report CAR histories, and CAR data on one bank is rendered noisy by its
takeover of a large bank during the analysis period. The results decisively rule out
substitutability as all the banks’ BLR coefficients are positive and highly statistically
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significant. Caution should be exercised though in interpreting the high t-Statistics owing to
the statistical problems associated with pooled panel data noted earlier on. BLQ, the measure
of the proportion of liquid deposits held, and BLSIZE are confirmed to be negatively related to
MFR, although the results on BLVA are still mixed. Most interestingly, as predicted, CAR is
negatively related to MFR in all but one positive but statistically insignificant case.
Substitutability is dominated by complementarity and bank prudential regulations
successfully compel banks to set aside capital against managed fund exposure at the exclusion
of most of Pennacchi’s (1998) indirect capital adequacy recoupment effects.
5.

Conclusion

Managed funds that are run by banks may intuitively appear to be substitutes for bank
deposits. However, this study finds suggestive evidence that, empirically, managed fund
assets under management and bank liability balances complement rather than displace each
other. This corroborates descriptive evidence that the liquidity, accessibility, safety, price
stability and popularity attributes of bank-affiliated managed funds are not, on strict analysis,
consistent with similar characteristics of bank deposits. The complementarity is not exclusive
though - in two out of the nine years constituting the analysis period a negative but
statistically insignificant relationship is observed between bank liabilities and managed fund
balance normalised by total bank assets. Some weak substitution effects may be emanating
from such factors as the ability of bank-affiliated funds to invest in parent bank deposits, thus
indirectly replacing the banks’ capacity to raise liabilities that is lost to prudential capital
provisioning. To directly verify this issue, running the substitution model on individual banks
after including the capital adequacy ratio variable shows that the measure is negatively related
to the volume managed fund business. Prudential regulatory requirements successfully
dissuade banks from using in-house investment management operations as an indirect conduit
for raising funds in the same manner as deposit taking.
This paper also documents a predominantly negative relationship between managed
funds and the aggregate size of a bank’s liabilities, reflecting that despite that evidence largely
supports complementarity, there are factors other than the existence of a managed fund
undertaking within a banking entity that strongly influence the growth of the bank’s liabilities.
Observed high variability in bank liabilities is negatively related to funds under management,
negating the prediction based on the assumption of substitutability that such variability may
induce banks to increase their reliance on managed funds for raising monies to on-lend on the
asset side. Not surprisingly, the authorisation of banks to operate retirement savings accounts,
that are essentially managed funds in nature and tax treatment, results in a reduced reliance on
managed funds.
The results of this paper may be instructive to bank managers, regulators and
researchers. Banks and regulators would be right to continue to regard bank deposits and
managed funds as belonging to different market definitions. The results also speak to the
academic debate on financial intermediation – the empirical behaviour of bank deposits and
managed funds suggests complementarity rather than substitutability and, as such, claims that
the observed reduction in traditional deposit-taking business is a direct result of the advent of
managed funds are likely premature. Bank participation in investment management activities
is perhaps better explained by theories that acknowledge that the intermediation landscape has
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been altered by the quest for banks to directly counter competition from such institutions as
managed funds.
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Notes
1.

Other reasons offered by Gallo et al (1996), quoting Kaufman and Mote (1994), for
bank participation in mutual fund activity are 1) the deregulation of bank mutual fund
activities past 1986; 2) the need to boost non-interest income to offset the decline in net
interest margins, a factor linked to the decline in deposits; 3) to reduce bank
unsystematic risk through diversification into new lines of business, citing Brewer,
1989; 4) to lock in scale economies by adapting the existing infrastructure to mutual
fund activities.

2.

See ACCC Merger Guidelines (ACCC Procedural Guidelines Series).

3.

See www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect .

4.

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s Class Order (CO 01/0050) of
22 January 2000 allows differential fee arrangements to be negotiated separately with
institutional (sophisticated) investors.

5.

For example, Australian fund managers suspended all redemptions in internationallyoriented managed funds for ten days following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks
on US targets.

6.

The so-called prudent-man rule was established in US courts in Harvard College v
Amory where it was held that “Trustees shall act in a manner as other trustees [later
referred to as ‘a prudent man’] would act under like circumstances”. See Del Guercio
(1996) and Cabot (1998) for historical accounts.

7.

The separation concept is also associated with the authorities attempts at dealing with
the “too big to fail” phenomenon.

8.

The discussion on the liability of managed fund investors in this paper is largely based
on various submissions to the Australian Treasury in respect of the Managed
Investments Act Review, in particular submissions by the Companies and Securities
Advisory Committee (March 2000) and Mr D E Routley (5 September 2001), available
online at http://miareview.treasury.gov.au .

9.

Specifically the legal precedent was set in JW Broomhead Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v JW
Broomhead Pty Ltd (1985) 3 ACLC 355, 9 ACLR 593, in which the court held that the
unit holders in a unit trust were liable to indemnify the trustee against liabilities incurred
in carrying on a business. In this case the court applied the principle of the proportionate
liability of trust beneficiaries. Similarly, Mcleon v Burns Philp Trustee Company Pty
Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 926 confirmed that the potential personal liability of trust
beneficiaries could be limited to the extent of the assets of the trust by a clause that
restricted the trustee’s recourse to those assets. However, such restriction would only be
valid if it was not contrary to public policy, as was held by the court to subsist in the
particular case. The situation is similar in the US where, under state law, the
shareholders of a trust (fund) may, in certain circumstances generally believed to be
remote, be held personally liable for the trust’s obligations. However, the Declaration of
Trust disclaims liability of shareholders and the trust’s trustees and officers for acts or
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obligations of the trust and requires that notice of such disclaimer be given in each
agreement, obligation, or contract entered into or executed by the trust or the Board of
Trustees. The Declaration of Trust provides for indemnification out of the assets of the
trust of all losses and expenses of any shareholder held personally liable for the
obligations of the trust. Thus, the risk of a shareholder incurring financial loss on
account of shareholder liability is considered remote, since it is limited to circumstances
in which the disclaimer is inoperative and the trust itself is unable to meet its
obligations.
10.

This aspect differs from the US where a combination of established market practice and
legislation has firmly established the maintenance of a price of one dollar on MMMFs
as the norm. In addition private insurance schemes that guarantee investors’ capital are
gaining in popularity. Pilloff (1999) and Farinella and Koch (1999) carry detailed
accounts of the issues surrounding capital preservation in US MMMFs.

11.

A safety issue that this study does not consider owing to data limitations is that of the
riskiness of the assets held by money-market oriented managed funds compared to
bank-operated money market deposits. This issue is important in light of the welldocumented principal-agent problem occasioned by the asymmetric nature of the
performance-based compensation of fund managers wherein the managers are
incentivised to alter their preference for risk to the detriment of investors. (See, for
example Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996, and Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).

12.

See FSI 1997.

13.

The logic applied in this section is based on the non-structural model popularised by
Ang and Peterson (1984) in the case of debt-lease substitution in firms.

14.

See Financial System Inquiry (FSI) (1997), page 119. The Australian Taxation Office
definition of an RSA is an account offered by banks, building societies, credit unions,
life insurance companies and prescribed financial institutions (RSA providers) used for
retirement savings and similar to a superannuation fund.

15.

The value of λ 1, however, is a measure of the MF to BL displacement ratio rather than
the BL to MF displacement ratio, α. Alpha cannot be determined by simply taking the
inverse of λ 1 due to the presence of a constant and other independent variables in the
regression model. However, should a substitutability relationship arise α can easily be
determined by swapping the MFR and BLR in the above equation to treat the BL as the
∂BLR
dependent variable, describing the following partial derivative:
= BL, MF
∂MLR
displacement ratio.

16.

ABN-AMRO Asset Management, Advance Funds Management (acquired by St George
Bank in 1997), ANZ Managed Investments Ltd, Barclays Global Investors,
Commonwealth Financial Services, Macquarie Investment Management Ltd, National
Australia Financial Management, Westpac Financial Services.

17.

This is useful in avoiding using a truncated dataset.
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Fig. 1: Summary of Pilloff’s (1999) Main Findings
Attribute
A
•

Liquidity Accessibility
and Convenience
Cheque and withdrawal
facilities

•

Maturity

•

ATM, telephone and
internet access
Low account
opening/maintenance
balances
Convenient locations
and access to branch
networks

•
•

B
•

•

Safety and price stability
Federal deposit
insurance
Diversified asset
holdings
Price maintained at $1

B
•

Demand behaviour
Popularity

•

Accounts at Insured Depository
Institutions

Money Market Mutual Funds

Full access

Restricted access

No maturity (withdrawal at any
time)
Full access

No maturity (withdrawal at any
time with limited restrictions)
ATM access generally absent

Generally applicable

Generally applicable

Access to bank branch network

Access to bank branch network
plus advisor network

Mostly applicable

Not applicable

Applicable to money market
deposit accounts*
Applicable automatically

Applicable to most products

Held by majority of households

Held by minority of households

Maintenance of $1 price
sometimes requires parent
intervention and private
insurance

* Similar to and treated as deposits but invested by banks in short-term low-risk money market assets
(Treasury bills, bank CDs, commercial paper, etc.) and usually require a minimum balance and set
limits on the number of monthly transactions (deposits and withdrawals by cheque).
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Fig. 2A: Market-Share Held by Australian Fund Managers

A. Funds Under Management as Percentage of GDP
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Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority.

Fig. 2A: Market-Share Held by Australian Fund Managers

B. Share of Total Funds Under Management
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Table 1: Annual OLS Coefficient Estimates of Mutual Funds–Bank
Liabilities Substitutability
PANEL A – heteroskedasticity-inconsistent results
Variable
Constant

BLR

BLQ

BLSIZE

BLVA

RSAD

Adjusted R2
Number of Banks
Number of Funds

2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
2.08
-3.49
4.27
5.86
4.79
6.15
2.95
0.97
1.56
(7.34) ** (-7.51) ** (10.89) ** (6.54) ** (22.12) ** (5.76) ** (10.56) ** (4.15) ** (3.02) ***
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
-0.21
0.22
0.18
0.22
-0.08
0.07
0.09
1.29
0.08
(-1.01)
(1.19)
(7.28) ** (6.25) ** (-0.37)
(16.64) ** (5.44) ** (4.20) ** (4.05) ***
*
*
*
*
*
2.25
12.23
0.52
-1.33
0.51
-1.41
-1.17
-2.06
1.61
(1.44)
(11.85) **
(2.07) ** (-1.21)
(1.32)
(-1.40)
(-3.92) ** (-2.79) ** (2.62) **
*
*
*
-0.20
0.13
-0.39
-0.51
-0.44
-0.50
-0.23
-0.10
-0.21
(-6.34) ** (3.07) ** (-10.99) ** (-6.97) ** (-21.35) ** (-6.00) ** (-11.20) ** (-5.01) ** (-5.38) ***
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
-0.49
5.08
-3.26
-2.26
-6.37
-8.87
-2.09
5.89
-1.54
(-3.21) ** (12.59) ** (-6.83) ** (-0.95)
(-14.78) ** (-4.67) ** (-6.63) ** (6.98) ** (-1.87) *
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
-0.09
-0.37
-0.19
0.24
(-1.52)
(-7.34) ** (-2.47) ** (2.80) **
*
*
0.75
0.93
0.75
0.72
0.87
0.78
0.65
0.64
0.48
7
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
190
182
160
164
149
144
129
110
89

PANEL B – White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent results
Variable
Constant

BLR

BLQ

BLSIZE

BLVA

2000
1999
2.08
-3.49
(4.09) ** (-4.07) **
*
*
-0.21
0.22
(-1.17)
(1.54)
2.25
1.16
-0.20
(-4.11) **
*
-0.49
(-1.97) *

12.23
9.78 **
*
0.13
(1.84) *

1998
1997
4.27
5.86
(5.32) ** (2.07) **
*
*
0.18
0.22
(15.03) ** (3.60) **
*
*
0.52
-1.33
2.03 ** -1.59

1996
4.79
(21.15) **
*
-0.08
(-0.45)

1995
1994
6.15
2.95
(3.69) ** (5.32) **
*
*
0.07
0.09
(4.62) ** (16.73) **
*
*
0.51
-1.41
-1.17
1.42
-3.12 **
-3.71 **
*
*
-0.39
-0.51
-0.44
-0.50
-0.23
(-5.74) ** (-2.08) ** (-20.34) ** (-3.66) ** (-5.33) **
*
*
*
*
-3.26
-2.26
-6.37
-8.87
-2.09
(-3.59) ** (-0.39)
(-15.59) ** (-3.29) ** (-3.60) **
*
*
*
*
-0.19
0.24
(-2.20) ** (1.65)
-

1993
0.97
(4.17) **
*
1.29
(4.72) **
*
-2.06
-3.27 **
*
-0.10
(-5.38) **
*
5.89
(6.49) **
*
-

1992
1.56
(3.33) ***
0.08
(2.05) **
1.61
3.31 **
-0.21
(-5.11) ***

5.08
-1.54
(6.81) **
(-2.72) *
*
RSAD
-0.09
-0.37
(-1.26)
(-5.98) **
*
Adjusted R2
0.75
0.93
0.75
0.72
0.87
0.78
0.65
0.64
0.48
Number of Banks
7
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
Number of Funds
190
182
160
164
149
144
129
110
89
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of bank-affiliated managed funds’ assets under management to total Australiandollar denominated bank assets. BLR is the ratio of aggregated selected investment-type bank liabilities to total Australian
dollar denominated bank assets; BLQ is a measure of the liquidity of all bank liabilities calculated as the ratio of current
deposits to total bank liabilities; BLSIZE is the size of the bank’s total liability exposure measured as the natural logarithm of
total bank liabilities, BLVA is variability of bank liabilities calculated as the coefficient of variation of bank liabilities in the
analysis year, RSAD is a dummy variable denoting whether the bank had approval to operate retirement savings accounts. The
expected sign for the BLR coefficient is negative if managed fund assets under management and bank investment-type
liabilities are substitutes and positive if they are complements. Two-tailed t-statistics are in parentheses and ***, **, and *
indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels.
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Table 2: Pooled OLS Coefficient Estimates of Mutual Funds–Bank
Liabilities Substitutability for Individual Banks
Variable
C

BLR

ANZ
0.14
(4.68) ***
0.03
(131.74) ***

CBA
0.78
(1.70) *
0.09
(55.76) ***

BLQ

-0.02
(-3.26) ***

0.04
(0.42)

BLSIZE

-0.01
(-4.57) ***

-0.04
(-1.26)

BLVA

-0.03
(-1.91) *

CAR

0.00
(-2.30) **

0.49
(3.38) ***
-0.03
(-1.78) *

MBL
6.68
(2.54) **
0.33
(2.04) **
-0.31
(-0.50)
-0.92
(-2.05 )**
2.10
(4.41 )***
0.10
(1.17)

NAB
0.24
(4.45) ***
0.15
(4.04) ***

WBL
0.20
(5.81) ***
0.06
(235.48) ***

-0.06
(-4.56) ***

-0.03
(-2.85) ***

-0.02
(-4.08) ***

-0.01
(-4.69) ***

0.01
(0.64)
0.00
(-2.47) **

-0.07
(-2.22) **
0.00
(-4.88) ***

Adjusted R2
0.83
0.99
0.28
0.25
0.91
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of bank-affiliated managed funds’ assets under management
to total Australian-dollar denominated bank assets. BLR is the ratio of aggregated selected investmenttype bank liabilities to total Australian dollar denominated bank assets; BLQ is a measure of the
liquidity of all bank liabilities calculated as the ratio of current deposits to total bank liabilities; BLSIZE
is the size of the bank’s total liability exposure measured as the natural logarithm of total bank
liabilities, BLVA is variability of bank liabilities calculated as the coefficient of variation of bank
liabilities in the analysis year, CAR is the total capital adequacy ratio for the bank. The expected sign
for the BLR coefficient is negative if managed fund assets under management and bank investmenttype liabilities are substitutes and positive if they are complements. Two-tailed t-statistics in
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White’s correction). ***, **, and * indicate
significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels.

